CBSE Class 11 Philosophy Nyaya Theory

NyÈya Theory of Knowledge

Need for Theory of Knowledge

Every school of philosophy (Dar„ana) in India has attempted a theory of knowledge (pramȇa„Èstra) on which its metaphysical structure is based. The ultimate goal of all philosophizing, and for thatmatter of all human enterprises, has been to realize perfection (mok–a) or fullest all round efflorescene of one's potentialities as the summum bonum of life and existence. For this realization knowledge of reality (tattvaj¤Èna) is an essential and necessary prerequisite. But it is believed that a theory of knowledge is propaedeutic to a theory of reality because before knowing the reality one has to know the nature of knowledge and modes of knowing. This belief is grounded in the fact that to philosophize is to reflect on the nature of reality given in experience. Every experience is caused by, and pertains to, an object which is a part of reality. Every experience has a built-in self-transcendence, an intentionality, pointing to an object. This reference to an object may be cognitive (awareness of) or non-cognitive (desire for etc.) A cognitive reference consists in revelation of an object (artha prakÈ„a) or in the making of a cognisor aware of it. Though every cognitive reference reveals an object, there is always a possibility of going astray in this reference and there is no guarantee that it would adequately and faithfully reveal its object. This possibility of error in cognitive reference necessitates an inquiry into its veracity. The entire epistemological pursuit begins with and centres around this task.

Nature of Cognition and Knowledge

A cognitive reference is a cognition (j¤Èna) of an object (artha) in terms of awareness of its existence, nature, relations and functions. A cognition reveals its object. It may reveal its object as it is (yathÈrtha) or different from what it is (ayathÈrtha). That cognition is knowledge(pramÈ/pramȇa) which reveals its object as it is, i.e., which is non-discordant (avisamvÈdaka) with its object. Non-discordance is known as truth (prÈmȇya). All other varieties of cognition (e.g., error, doubt, indecisiveness etc.) are not knowledge (apramÈ). Only that cognition can claim the status of knowledge whose nondiscordance or truth is well-evidenced. There has to be indubitability(asamdigdhatva) with regard to the truth of that cognition. Only true cognition is knowledge and truth of knowledge needs to be wellevidenced on the basis of cogent and convincing evidence known as pramȇa. Thus, in a knowledgesituation there are three elements, viz., pramÈ (true cognition), prÈmȇya (truth) and pramȇa (evidencing condition which is also originating condition). On the basis of cognitivity-claim knowledge is distinguished from volition, feeling etc. Within cognitive domain, again, knowledge is differentiated from memory, doubt, error, conjectures etc.

NyÈya Theory of Knowledge

Knowledge not Justified True Belief only

Instead of understanding knowledge in terms of 'justified true belief’, contrasting it with opinion as is done in the western tradition, Indian thinkers point out three essential components of knowledge. They are (i) cognitive reference to an object (artha vi–ayakatva), (ii) exactitude of reference (yathÈrthatva) and (iii) indubitability or certitude about exactness (asamdigdhatva). This means knowledge-content must be caused and determined by object-content. This is necessary condition and sufficient condition is indubitability. The object must be real and not imaginary or fictitious. This is very important and basic condition and this distinguishes Indian epistemology and logic from its western counterpart. To be real means to exist or to be capable of being existent. Only when an object is existent (astitva) there can be decision about exactitude or true apprehension of the object. Then only there can be indubitability by adducing conclusive or sufficient evidence (s) for its truth.

Thus, the Indian thinkers out-step subject-centricity of belief and bring in primacy of object reference. So, in a knowledge-game there are four players, viz., knower (pramÈtÈ), known object (prameya), knowledge and truth (pramÈ and prÈmȇya) and mode of knowing and evidencing ( pramȇa).

The Problem of Pramȇa

The problem of pramȇa or evidencing the truth of knowledge has received serious and foremost attention of epistemological thinkers. This problem has given rise to much stimulating debate in the philosophical treatises. As stated earlier, the question of evidencing the truth of knowledge arises because all cognitions are not at par or equal in their epistemic status. Some appear to be true and may reveal their objects as they are whereas others seem to be erroneous and may misrepresent their objects. Had all cognitions been true, there would have been no need of evidencing them and the entire epistemological inquiry would not have arisen. The very possibility of error or doubt etc. in cognition necessitates its subjection to a critical examination with a view to establish its truth or falsity. If the truth or falsity of cognition needs to be established, the question arises what sort of criterion is to be adopted. The problem of pramȇa has been raised and discussed precisely against this background.

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